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CONTRACTs-LIABILITY OF BUILDING CONTRACTOR FOR SOUNDNESS OF
STRUCTURE-REIMBURSEMENT FROM VENDOR OF MATERIALS.-FLANNERY V.
ST. Louis ARCHITECTURAL IRON Co. (igi6) 185 N. W. (Mo.) 76o.-The
plaintiff, a contractor employed to erect a garage, purchased steel trusses
from the defendant. In order to furnish the trusses in the lengths speci-
fied, the defendant welded short rods together, and delivered them to the
plaintiff with a latent defect at the place of welding. Due to this defect
the roof collapsed a few months after the completion of the building.
The plaintiff reconstructed the roof at an expense of $268.55, and then
sued the defendant on an implied warranty of the quality of the struc-
tural steel. Held, that the expenditure made by the plaintiff in the recon-
struction of the roof must be regarded as voluntary on his part and the
defendant need not reimburse the plaintiff for the expense incurred.
The court assumed, at the start, that the plaintiff was not liable to the
owner of the building, since the defect was hidden and the plaintiff had
performed his part in a workmanlike manner; and in so assuming, fol-
lowed the case of Wisconsin Brick Co. v. Hood (1899) 67 Minn. 329
(bricks made from clay apparently suitable). While the above is the only
direct authority, a strong analogy to the position of the plaintiff in the
principal case is presented by that of manufacturers or vendors of articles,
who are held impliedly to warrant their products, in part manufactured
by them, sound and fit for the purpose for which they know they are
intended. Williston, Sales, sec. 232. And this is so, even though the
failure has been due to a latent defect. Murray Iron Works Co. v.
De Kalb Electric Co. (19o2) io3 Ill. App. 78; Randall v. Newson (1877)
2 Q. B. D. io2. Thus a heating plant must operate successfully. Ideal
Heating Co. v. Kramer (i9o5) 127 Ia. 137. So a boiler in a tug-boat
should be sound and free from defects, although they are discoverable
only by actual use. The Nimnrod (905) 141 Fed. 215; cf. MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 11 N. E. (N. Y.) 1o5o; 25 YAI.E LAW JOURNAL,
679 (a defective machine assembled and sent out by defendant as manu-
facturer). By acceptance of the article, latent defects are not thereby
waived. Cannon v. Hunt (1902) 116 Ga. 452; Bagley v. Cleveland Rolling
Mill Co. (1884) 21 Fed. 159. Thus, if the reasoning of the above analogy
were to establish the liability of the present plaintiff to the owner of the
building, the present defendant could in turn be held liable for the defect
in the material furnished by him. Injury caused by using warranted goods
in manufacturing other articles is recoverable, unless the buyer was negli-
gent or unreasonable in failing to discover the defects before using the
goods. Williston, Sales, sec. 614. And it would not then be necessary to
wait until suit by the owner of the building before bringing this action
against the defendant. Donald v. Guy (i9o3) 127 Fed. 228; see also
Randall v. Raper (1858) E. B. & E. 82.
A. S. B.
CONTRACTs-CONTRACT, OF EMPLOYMENT-PERFORMANCE TO SATISFAC-
TION.-HANAFORD V. STEVENS CO. (1916) 98 ATL. (R. I.) 20.-The plain-
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tiff, a travelling salesman, agreed to perform his duties in a manner
satisfactory to the defendant. He was discharged on the ground that his
services were not satisfactory in that he failed to notify the defendant
of his whereabouts for a period of nine days. Held, that the contract
required only performance to the satisfaction of a reasonable man, that
the defendants' dissatisfaction was unreasonable, and that the discharge
was wrongful.
The cases involving such stipulations are of two kinds. In one class
the decision of the party to the contract is conclusive, his personal
satisfaction being an absolute condition precedent. Wood Reaping &
M. Machine Co. v. Smith (1883) 50 Mich. 571. In this class, the object
of the contract is to gratify taste, or satisfy individual preference, as
where a tailor agrees to make a suit to the satisfaction of a customer,
or where an artist agrees to paint a portrait satisfactorily. Schwartz v.
Cohen (I911) 129 N. Y. S. 464; Claussen v. Vonnoh (19o7) 105 N. Y. S.
102. In these cases the promisee must act in good faith. Hay v. Hassett
(1916) 156 N. W. (Ia.) 734; Hawkes v. Daley (1911) 85 Conn. x6.
But if his dissatisfaction is honest, it is not material whether or not
it is reasonable. Crawford v. Mail and Exp. Pub. Co. (igoo) 163 N. Y.
404. In the second class are cases where there is some objective test
of proper performance, a test which the court can apply as well as the
individual. Here, the condition precedent is that performance shall, in
the judgment of the court, pass the test successfully. Keller v. Clifford
(1897) I65 Ill.. 544; Schmand v. Jandorf (1913) 14o N. W. (Mich.) 996;
Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden (1886) ioi N. Y. 387. Personal ser-
vice contracts are often such that performance cannot be judged by an
objective standard, and personal satisfaction is a condition precedent
The court in the principal case refuses to consider the contract as one
involving person taste or fancy, but rather views it as one of the second
class, involving merely mechanical or operative fitness. To the contrary,
on a similar set of facts, see Spring v. Ansonia Clock Co. (i88i) 24 Hun
(N. Y.) 175; Sax v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. (igoo) 125 Mich. 252.
S. J. T.
EVIDENcE-FORMER TESTIMONY-ABSENcE OF WITNESS Ix CIr. AcrioN
FROM JURISDICTION.-STEPHENS ET AL. v. HOFFMAN ET AL. (1916) 114
N. E. (ILL.) i42.-In an ejectment suit, testimony given at a former trial
was offered in evidence. The witness had moved to another state sub-
sequent to the former trial, but no reason was shown why his evi-
dence might not have been taken by deposition. Held, that because of
the possibility of securing a deposition, the former testimony was
inadmissible.
In order that a party may be permitted to introduce testimony given
at a former trial of the same issue between the same parties, the law
requires that the unavailability of the absent witness be proved. See
U. S. v. Macomb (1851) 5 McLean, 286, 292; cf. Lyttle v. Denny (19o9)
222 Pa. St. 395 (deposition). In civil cases it is settled, according to
the .great weight of authority, that absence from the jurisdiction alone
constitutes sufficient grounds for admitting such testimony, even though no
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effort has been made to secure either the attendance of the witness or his
deposition. McGovern v. Hays & Smith (1902) 75 Vt. 1O4; Railroad
Co. v. Osborn (19o2) 64 Kan. 187; Wheeler v. Jenison (1899) 120 Mich.
422; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1312. An increasing number of courts,
however, seemingly impressed with the ease with which depositions may
now be procured, require proof that it is impossible to secure a deposition
from the absent witness. Kirchner v. Laughlin (189o) 5 N. M. 365;
Gastrell v. Phillips (1886) 64 Miss. 473; Slusser v. Burlington (1877)
47 Ia. 3oo. There would hardly seem to be adequate ground for sup-
porting this departure from the older rule. Former testimony, even though
technically hearsay, represents the very highest grade of that class of
evidence, having been subjected to the all-important cross-examination
and the perjury penalty. See 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 405. It is clear,
moreover, that a deposition would not be likely to constitute better
evidence than the former testimony. If the deposition is claimed to be
necessary, why should not the party so contending have the burden of
obtaining and offering it? Possibly, as a compromise, it would be fair
to require the proponent of former testimony to give timely notice to
the opposing party, thus giving the latter ample opportunity to take steps
to secure a deposition if he so desires. S. F. D.
EVIDENCE-WVITNESSES-COMPETENCY OF JUDGE.--HALE v. WYATT (1916)
98 ATL. (N. H.) 379.-On an appeal from the probate court's disallowance
of a will, the issue being the mental unsoundness of the testator, the
appellee introduced the voluntary testimony of the probate judge as to
a statement of one of the appellants in inquisition proceedings against
the testator before the execution of the will, to the effect that the
testator was insane. Held, that this voluntary testimony of a judge, as
to a statement made at a prior hearing before him, was admissible.
The objections to the competency of a judge as a witness are not
based on the general nature of his office, and do not go to the extent
of rendering him incompetent to testify in all trials during his term.
Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. III, sec. 19o9; State v. Duffy (1889) 57 Conn.
525. They exist chiefly in cases where the presiding judge also acts as
a witness, because of formal difficulties in conducting the trial, and the
general tendency to lower the dignity of the judicial office. Rogers v.
State (1894) 6o Ark. 76; People v. Dohring (1874) 59 N. Y. 374; Estes
v. Bridgforth (1896) 114 Ala. 221; Gray v. Crockett (1886) 35 Kan. 66;
Ross v. Buhler (1824) 14 La. 312. The difficulties to be overcome in
such cases do not present themselves where a judge, who is not presiding,
testifies to a fact which occurred before him at a previous trial. State v.
Houghton (9o4) 45 Or. iiO; State v. Duffy, supra; Welcome v. Batch-
elder (18o3) 23 Me. 85; State v. Bringgold (905) 4o Wash. 12. On
grounds of public policy, however, a judge is not allowed to contradict
what he has certified to officially, or to state the grounds on which his
decision was based. Noland v. People (1905) 8o Pac. (Col.) 887;
. 0. 0. F. v. Allmon (1897) 39 Atl. (Del.) lO98; see Highberger v.
Stuffler (1864) 21 Md. 338. If the judge's evidence is vitally important,
it would seem that the interests of justice demand its admission unless
material obstacles present themselves. R. L. S.
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GAMING-BETTING-SKILL AS THE TEST OF LEGALITY.-PEERS V. CALDWELL
[1916] I K. B. 371.-A machine was operated by putting into a slot a half-
penny which released a ball, causing it to slide down an incline and collide
with pins.' Below was a bar with a receptacle which could be manipulated
by the user. If he was successful in catching the ball he was to receive
2d. worth of sweets. Held, that this was in contravention of sec. i
of the Betting Act of 1853 making it an offense to use ones' premises
for the purpose of receiving money depending on a contingency. Lush,
J., dissenting.
In support of the principal case see Barrett v. Flynn [1916] 2 Ir. I.
But, on the other hand, a manipulation of the very machine of the prin-
cipal case was held a game of skill under the Gaming Act of I845 and
no offense. Pesser v. Catt (913) 77 J. P. 129. In both cases the Eng-
lish court regarded the element of skill as the test of gaming. In the
United States, this test alone is not sufficient. It has been held that an
agreement that the loser of a billiard or pool game shall pay for playing,
amounts to gaming. Murphy v. Rogers (x89o) 151 Mass. 118. Similarly,
where the loser of a poker game is under an agreement to treat. State
v. Wade (1884) 43 Ark. 77. But running a horse on the track of
an association which contributes the purse is not gambling. People v.
Fallon (i896) 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 82. Insurance companies which cover
extraordinary contingencies are not questioned as to the legality of their
contracts, though having less chance for the exercise of skill in fore-
casting than one has in a game of cards for stakes. All risks may be
insured against except those forbidden by public policy or statute. Franch
v. Hope Ins. Co. (1835) 16 Pick (Mass.) 397. Three elements seem
to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not an agree-
ment to pay on a contingency is gaming within the meaning of the law:
first, is skill exercised-the least important element; second, does the
enterprise tend toward disorder, or breach of the peace; third, does the
public receive any benefit from the aleatory contract?
G. S., Jr.
LIDEL AND SLANDER-STATUTORY ACrION FOR INSULTING WoRos-DAM-
AGES.-MICHAELSON v. TURK (xgi6) go S. E. (W. Va.) 395.-An action
was brought under a statute declaring to be actionable, all words which,
from their usual construction and common acceptation, are construied as
insults and tend to violence and breach of the peace. Held, that the jury
might presume malice from the use of the words, and though the de-
fendant might rebut this presumption by showing absence of malice,
the plaintiff was entitled to recover for loss of reputation. Mason, J.,
dissenting.
The court treats this case as an action for slander, in which the words
are made actionable per se by the statute. And although the defendant
may show the absence of actual malice, and so protect himself from
punitive damages, this will not bar the action. King v. Patterson (1887)
49 N. J. L. 417; Minter v. Bradstreet Co. (i9o3) x74 Mo. 444. At com-
mon law the basis of the action and the award of damages is the injury
to the plaintiff's reputation. Broderick v. James (871) 3 Daly (N. Y.)
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481; Weir v. Hoss (1844) 6 Ala. 881. But the gist of the action under
a statute like that in the principal case is injury to the feelings,
arousing anger and tending to cause a breach of the peace. Brooks v.
Calloway (1841) 12 Leigh (Va.) 466. The offended party cannot blend
the two actions into one count. Chaffin v. Lynch (1887) 83 Va. io6;
Payne v. Tancil (igoo) 98 Va. 262. Accordingly it would seem that the
plaintiff in the principal case should not have been allowed to recover
for loss of reputation.
J. N. M.
MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF FATHER FOR INJURY
BY MINOR SON IN OPERATING PLFASURE CAR.-LEMKE v. ADY (1916) 159
N. W. (IA.) iol.--The defendant owned a motor car used exclusively
for pleasure. His minor son, while operating the car for his mother and
two guests, negligently injured the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant was
liable on the ground of agency for the tort committed by the son.
A father is not responsible for the torts of his minor child, com-
mitted without his knowledge or consent, if it is not in the course of
his employment. Wilson v. Garrard (1871) 59 Ill. 51; Needles v. Buck
(1884) 81 Mo. 569. Accordingly, the liability of the father for torts
committed by the son in negligently driving the father's car, rests solely
on their relation as master and servant. Linville v. Nissen (1913) 162
N. C. 95; see Towers v. Errington (1912) 138 N. Y. S. 119. An attempt
has been made to hold the owner liable for the negligence of anyone
driving with his permission on the ground that the automobile is a
dangerous agency per se. See Hays v. Hogan (1914) 18o Mo. App. 237.
This, however, has not been commonly recognized. Parker v. Wilson
(1912) 179 Ala. 361; Jones v. Hoge (19o7) 47 Wash. 663. Courts apply
different tests in determining when a minor son is a servant of the
father in operating the latter's car. A mere general permission that
the son may use the car for his own personal pleasure does not render
the father liable. Hays v. Hogan, supra; Parker v. Wilson, supra.
However, the relation of master and servant has been held to exist
where the son was the only one in the family licensed to operate the
machine and was driving the car for his mother's pleasure. Smith v.
Jordan (1912) 211 Mass. 269. The same relation is created where the
son was driving the car for his sister's entertainment. State v. Morris
(1912) 147 Ky. 386. If, however, the car, taken by the son for pleasure,
is one which is usually driven by a chauffeur and used in the owner's
business, the courts hesitate to find the existence of the relation of master
and servant. Parker v. Wilson, supra. In the principal case the agency
of the son appears to have been sufficiently established to render the
father liable.
R. W. D.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-"HAZARDOUS EM-
PLOYMENT" -- APPLICATION TO NIGHT WATCHMAN IN ESTABLiSHMENT SO
CLASSiFm.-FoGARTY v. NATIONAL BISCUIT Co. (1916) 161 N. Y. S.
937-The plaintiff's intestate, a night watchman for the defendant, re-
ceived injuries resulting in his death from a fall down stairs while on
duty when the plant was not in operation. The "defendant's business was
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classed as hazardous under the New York Workmen's Compensation
Law, sec. 2. Held, that the deceased was not engaged in a hazardous
employment within the meaning of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, sec. 2, and the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Kellogg,
J., dissenting.
It is the character, and not the place of employment which determines
whether the classification "hazardous employment" shall apply in a
particular instance. Oberg v. . C. McRoberts & Co. (1916) 161 N. Y. S.
934. In this case a watchman of ship cargoes on the docks was held
not to be a "longshoreman" within sec. 2 of the above act classing as
"hazardous employment" longshore work. Likewise no recovery was
allowed for injuries to an employee of a cheese factory, similarly classified,
since he was engaged exclusively in gathering ice for the factory. See
the case of Aylesworth v. Phoenix Cheese Co. (1915) 155 N. Y. S. 96.
However, recovery was allowed for the death of a night watchman on a
building under construction. Sorge v. Aldebaran Co. (i916) 218 N. Y.
636. The construction of the building was designated as "hazardous em-
ployment." This case can be distinguished from the principal case, as
pointed out in the majority opinion, on the ground that a night watchman
of a building in the course of construction is as directly exposed to the
risks of the business as the other employees.
F. W. D.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WHAT CONSTITUTES
"INJURY By AccrDENT."--GLASGOW COAL Co. LTD. v. WELSH (igi6) 114
L. T. 8og.-The plaintiff obeyed an order to descend into the defendant's
pit thinking he was going to his usual work. He was then directed to
bail out an accumulation of water, a purpose which could be accomplished
only by standing in the water for eight hours. As a result he contracted
rheumatism and was rendered unfit for work. He sued under the Act
of i9o6 (6 Edw. VII, c. 58), sec. I, providing compensation for "personal
injury by accident" arising out of, and in the course of employment.
Held, that the miscalculated action of entering the water in obedience
to orders was a definite event, possessing the character of an accident,
and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Apparently the better construction of this ambiguous statutory provi-
sion is to regard accident as the unforeseen, inducing circumstance or
cause rather than the direct means by which injury is produced. Accord-
ingly, injury by accident does not necessarily imply the direct applica-
tion of external force. Stewart v. Wilson's & Clyde Coal Co. (IgO2)
5 Fraz. 120; Kelly v. Auchenlea Coal Co. (Igii) Sess. Cas. 864. Disease
occasioned to employees from water furnished them for drinking pur-
poses was held to be bodily injury accidentally inflicted. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Portland Gas & Coke Co. (I916) 229 Fed. 552; Fenton v. Thorley
& Co. Ltd. (19o3) 89 L. T. 314. But disease gradual in its inception
has not been accepted as an accidental injury. Brinton's Ltd. v. Turvey
(igo5) 92 L. T. 578. Re John Sheeran (igio) 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 254.
Just why the courts, after having discarded in many instances the ictic
theory of injury by accident, have stopped here is not apparent unless




MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-GOVERNMENTAL AcTs-DISPLAY OF FIRE-
WORKS POPE V. CITY OF NEW HAVEN (i916) 99 ATL. (CONN.) 5I.-The
City of New Haven conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, in-
cluding a display of fireworks on a public square. A bomb, intended to
explode in the air, failed to explode until it reached the ground, and killed
the plaintiff's intestate, a spectator on the street. Held, that the city was
engaged in the performance of a governmental duty and hence not liable.
Wheeler and Roraback, JJ., dissenting.
It is a disputed question whether or not a patriotic celebration accom-
panied by a display of fireworks constitutes the performance of a gov-
ernmental duty. In accord with the principal case are Tindley v. City
of Salem (1884) 137 Mass. 171; Kerr v. Inhabitants of Brookline (1911)
208 Mass. igoi. Where the fireworks display was unauthorized, the city
was held not liable. Love v. Raleigh (895) 116 N. C. 296; Ball v.
Woodbine (1883) 61 Ia. 83. On the other hand the municipality was
held liable, as such a display constituted a nuisance, when held at the
intersection, of two streets. Spier v. City of Brooklyn (1893) 139 N. Y. 6.
To the same effect, see Landau v. City of New York (19o4) 18o N. Y. 48;
Conklin v. Thompson (1859) 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 218; Jenne v. Sutton
(188I) 43 N. J. L. 257. The city is liable, if, in the exercise of a govern-
mental duty, it performs an act "intrinsically dangerous." Mootry v.
Town of Danbury (1878) 45 Conn. 550; Norwalk Gas Light Co. v.
Borough of Norwalk (1893) 63 Conn. 495 (use of dynamite by city in
excavating). The question whether a voluntary spectator of a display
of fireworks assumes the risk of injury, is not raised in the principal
case. It has been held that the spectator assumed the risk. Scanlon v.
Wedger (x892) i56 Mass. 462; contra, Dowell v. Guthrie (1889) 99 Mo.
653.
E. J. M.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC MONEY-LIABILITY OF OFFICER FOR
Loss.-TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF BATH V. McBIDE (1916) 113 N. E.
(N. Y.) 789.-The board of trustees of a village accepted by resolution
a bank's offer of specified interest for funds left on deposit for six
months, or longer. The village treasurer, elected five months later, con-
tinued to leave the public money deposited by his predecessor in this
bank. On the failure of the bank, he was sued on his bond. Held, that
the treasurer was bound to make good the loss, even in the absence of
fault or neglect on his part.
At common law a public officer, as a county treasurer, is not a mere
bailee or custodian of public funds in his hands; they are his own,
subject to his personal use and profit; he is the debtor of the public.
Shelton v. State (1876) 53 Ind. 132; Perley v. Muskegon Cty. (1875) 32
Mich. 132. Hence, the trustee of a township is liable as an insurer to
the full amount of the funds received by him. McClelland v. State
(1894) 138 Ind. 321; Tillingham v. Merrill (1896) 151 N. Y. 135. This
rule has been steadily suffering modification, in the curtailment of the
officer's freedom of action. Thus, the township is declared to have the
equitable title to money received by its trustee. Elliott v. Pontius (1893)
136 Ind. 641. Or, the county treasurer is by statute held to an accounting
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at the end of his term. Mo. Rev. St. (1889) sec. 3175. Even where the
relation is still admitted to be that of debtor and creditor, the treasurer
is liable in trover for money converted to his own use. Monroe Township
v. Whipple (885) 56 Mich. 216. The culmination of this development
is illustrated by the position of the county official under Mich. Comp.
Laws (1901) secs. 1197-1200, which state that he must keep the public
funds separate from his own, may not loan them, may deposit them in
a bank only when authorized, and is then to pay the interest over to
the county. Board of Supervisors of Kent County v. Verkerke (19oi) 128
Mich. 202. Yet the absolute liability which was founded in the debtor-
creditor relation has persisted throughout. Only for dispositions of the
public money authorized by the representatives of the public is the
official relieved of responsibility. See State v. Hauser (1878) 63 Ind. I55;
City of Newark v. Dickerson (1883) 45 N. J. L. 38. In the principal
case the power of the village board of trustees to authorize the deposit
in a particular bank is doubted, and it is denied that their resolution was
such authorization as would free the treasurer from liability, even if
they have such power.
K. N. L.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO TrRD PARTIES-NATURE
OF THE GOODS AT TEST.-FoRD MOTOR Co. v. LivEsAY (igi6) i6o PAc.
(OKL.) 9oi.-The plaintiff bought an automobile from a person not
shown to be an agent of the defendant, and was injured when the spokes
of one of the wheels broke. The wheel had not been made by the de-
fendant, but the complete machine had been assembled by him. Held,
that a manufacturer of an automobile is not liable to third parties who
are not in contractual relations with him, for negligence in the con-
struction or manufacture of such machine.
There is a recognized conflict as to whether automobiles should be
put in the class of imminently dangerous articles for which manufac-
turers are vicaripusly responsible. The courts of two states have held
that they should be so regarded. Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer (ig1)
145 Ky. 616; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co. (1915) 153 N. Y. S. 131;
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (igi6) 111 N. E. (N. Y.) 105O; 25
YALE LAv JOURNAL, 679. The principal case follows the federal courts'
decision in Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson (1915) 22i Fed. 8or. It
is also in accord with the English and American views as to carriages;
but, as pointed out in 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 679, the analogy is by no
means exact, since the modern automobile has so much greater possibili-
ties of danger because of its great speed and power. It would seem
reasonable to predict that the decision of the principal case will not be
so generally followed as the more progressive New York doctrine.
F. W. D.
SALES-STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-LiABILITY OF UNPAID VENDOR FOR
FREIGHT.-BOOTH STEAMSHIP Co. Lim. v. CARGO FLEET IRON Co. LIm. (igi6)
115 L. T. 199.-The defendants, vendors, upon learning of the buyers'
insolvency, exercised their right of stoppage in transitu upon a cargo of
iron rails shipped to Brazil, but repudiated all responsibility and refused
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to direct the plaintiffs, carriers, as to what disposition to make of the
rails. The plaintiffs sued to recover the full amount of the affreightment
as if for completed passage, though the defendants were not parties to
the contract of affreightment. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover full freight charges as damages for breach of the obligation to
take possession and discharge the plaintiff's lien.
In the earlier stages of this peculiar procedure an effective exercise
of the right of stoppage in transitu necessitated a regaining of physical
possession of the goods, which in turn required a satisfaction of the car-
rier's lien as condition precedent. Northey v. Lewis (1798) 2 Esp. 613;
Snee v. Prescott (1743) 1 Atk. 245. Subsequent relaxation of the rule
permitted an unpaid vendor to deprive the vendee of the right to posses-
sion by mere notice to the carrier. Oppenheim v. Russell (1802) 3 Bos. &
P. 42; Rucker v. Donovan & Feiferlich (1872) 13 Kan. 251; Frame v.
Oregon Liquor Co. (i9o6) 48 Or. 272. In the jurisdiction of the principal
case, the carrier's duty on receipt of such notice is not only not to deliver
to the consignee but "to deliver to or according to the directions of the
seller." Sales of Goods Act, Sec. 46, subsec. 2. The latter duty is of
course incurred only upon satisfaction of his own lien for affreightment.
The question is, then, is such satisfaction a right of the carrier's? Does
the service of notici by the vendor involve a duty to pay the freight?
If such a duty exists, it is clearly not contractual in character. On
the other hand it is somewhat strained to say that the vendor has com-
mitted a tort. Of course the carrier has been damaged to the extent of
losing affreightment charges from the consignee; but the notice which
caused that loss was, at the time, legal. The better and shorter disposal
of the case is to treat it as the deliberate creation of a common law
debt; i. e., simultaneously with the right of the vendor that the goods
shall not be delivered to the consignee, and the correlative duty of the
carrier not to deliver, there arises a corresponding duty on the part of
the vendor to satisfy the carrier's lien for affreightment, and a correla-
tive right of the carrier to be paid. There is not such an enrichment to
the vendor as forms the basis of an ordinary quasi-contract; but by the
notice to stop delivery, the vendor has deprived the carrier of his right
against the consignee, and has created in himself the power of regaining
property rights by paying freight charges. This power is valuable as a
security, and may well be made the basis of a non-contract debt at com-
mon law.
R. L. S.
SLANDER-CHARGE OF PERSONAL IMMoRALT Y AGAINST A TEAcHER-
AcTioNABILiTY PER sE.-JoNES v. JoNES (i916) 115 L. T. 432.-The
respondent imputed immoral conduct on the part of the appellant, a
schoolmaster, with a married woman. There was no evidence of special
damage, or of reflection, other than the above statement, on the appellant
in his professional capacity. Held, that the words were not actionable
per se.
Words imputing immorality must be spoken of one in respect to his
professional conduct or capacity in order to be actionable without show-
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ing special damage. Lumby v. Allday (1830) i Cromp. & J. 305, 306; Ayre
v. Craven (1834) 2 A. & E. 2; Doyley v. Roberts (837) 3 Bing. (N. Cas.)
835; Buck v. Hersey (I85o) 3T Me. 558. The extl-eme case of Ayre v.
Craven, supra, in which it was held that words imputing adultery to a
physician were not actionable, because his conduct was not connected by
the speaker with his profession, has been widely followed. See Morasse
v. Brochu (I8go) 151 Mass. 567, 576. The case of words imputing im-
morality to a clergyman is the one recognized exception. Chaddock v.
Briggs (1876) 13 Mass. 285; see Gallwey v. Marshall (1853) 9 Ex. 294;
Potter v. IV. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co. (I9O2) 68 App. Div. (N. Y.)
95. It seems desirable that a rule which appears so artificial and arbitrary
should be altered by legislation, if the courts do not find themselves free
to extend the common law interpretation. Cf. Slander of Women Act
(I89i) ; Gen. Code of Ohio, sec. 13383.
R. L. S.
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIEs-DscRIMINATIoN IN SUPPLYING
STOCK QUOTATIONS-PRIVATE PROPERTY IN SAM.-WESTERN UNION TELE-
GRAPH COMPANY V. FOSTER (i916) 113 N. E. (MASS.) I92.-The New York
stock exchange furnished stock quotations to the Western Union Tele-
graph Company under a contract which permitted it to give ticker service
only to those approved by the exchange. The plaintiff applied for ticker
service, but the exchange withheld its approval and the telegraph company
refused to install the service. Held, that although the stock quotations
of the stock exchange were its private property and it could dispose of
them as it saw fit, nevertheless it could not, through a telegraph company,
thus discriminate against individuals, and that a telegraph company having
once acquired such quotations must serve the public impartially.
The quotations of a stock exchange are the result of transactions on its
floor. They are gathered by its employees and the stock exchange has a
property right in them. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain Stock Co. (19o2)
II6 Fed. 944; Board of Trade v. Thomson Commission Co. (19oo) 1o3
Fed. 9o2. Having such property right, regulations with respect to their
disposal may be made. Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange (igo6) 205
U. S. 222; Board of Trade v. Cellia Commission Co. (i9o6) 145 Fed. 28.
But having once transferred its quotations to a telegraph company, no
restriction which subverts the common law obligations of a public service
corporation will be given effect. Telegraph Co. v. Telephone Co. (1888)
6I Vt. 241. Nor can the corporation rely upon such restriction as a ground
for discrimination. State v. Telephone Co. (I88o) 36 Oh. St. 297; Mis.
souri v. Bell Telephone Co. (I885) 23 Fed. 539. It has, however, been held
that a telegraph company could insist that an applicant sign a statement,
demanded by the stock exchange in its contract with the telegraph com-
pany, that the applicant will not use the quotations in running a bucket
shop, as such condition would be a reasonable regulation on the part of
a public service company itself. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State (i9o5)
I65 Ind. 492. See The rnter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. The Associated Press4
(19oo) 184 Ill. 438.
A. S. B.
RECENT CASES
WILLS-CHARGING LEGACIES ON REAL ESTATE-EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
SHOW INTENTION.-ELLIS V. MEGIE (1916) 113 N. E. (N. Y.) 8oo.-A
testator bequeathed legacies greatly exceeding the amount of his per-
sonal property, as he knew at the time he drew the will. Held, that these
legacies were a charge on the undevised real estate, and that extrinsic
evidence was admissible to show the testator's intention that they should
be such a charge.
Unless legacies are charged on the real estate by the will, either in
express terms or by clear implication, the personal estate is not only
the primary but the only fund for their payment. 40 Cyc. 2011; Post v.
Moore (1905) i8i N. Y. I5; Taylor vt. Dodd (1874) 58 N. Y. 335;
Wentworth v. Read (1897) i66 Ill. I3I. In determining whether the
real estate has been charged, a will is not to be construed by anything
dehors, when there is no latent ambiguity. Heslop v. Gatton (1874) 71
Ill. 528; Wentworth v. Read, supra; Duvall's Estate (1892) I3 Pa. St.
176. A charge of legacies on the "estate" of the testator is generally
construed as charging them on the realty in case of a deficiency of
personalty, unless there is a contrary intention manifest. In re Lloyd's
(1896) 174 Pa. St. 184; contra, Todd v. McFall (I899) 96 Va. 764. In such
cases extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the testator's intention.
Davidson v- Coon (i89o) 125 Ind. 497. But where the testator directed
that a certain legacy be paid out of his personal estate, the real estate
was held not to be charged, even though the personal estate turned out
to be insufficient, and the testator must have know it would be. Hibler
v. Hibler ('895) io4 Mich. 274. The basis of the decision in the principal
case was the fact that, in connection with the language and the general
scheme of the testator, it was evident that the expression "personal
estate" was used to indicate an intention that the entire estate should
be converted into money for the payment of legacies. Though ordinarily
the words "personal estate" have a fixed and definite meaning, this case
may be justified on the above ground.
J. I. S.
WILLS-DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIAaIES-REPUGNANCY OF PROVISIONS-
EXCLUSION FROM BENEFITS UNDER WILL-IN RE CLARKE (1916) I61
N. Y. S. 484-The second clause of the testator's will read as follows:
"Inasmuch as my eldest son, E., has during my life received so much of
my estate as would be equal to or greater than the share hereinafter
bequeathed to his brothers, I make no provision for him by this will."
There were later provisions which directed one-quarter of a trust fund
to be paid to each of the testator's three sons other than E. and to P.,
the son of "E., at P's majority. In case P. should die without issue,
the entire estate was to be divided into three equal parts, and paid to
the three sons above mentioned; and if any of the three sons should die
without issue, his share was to be divided among "his brothers him'
surviving" and said P. and the issue of any brother that may have died
before him. Held, that the one-quarter share of one of the three sons
mentioned, dying without issue, should be divided equally among P. and
the three brothers, including E., in disregard of the second clause quoted
above. Cochrane and Lyon, JJ., dissenting.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The majority of the court, as well as the dissenting judges, found
that the scheme of the testator was to attain substantial equality in the
division of his estate among his heirs. The former, however, held that
there was a repugnancy between the two clauses in question. One ground
on which the court held that E. was entitled to a share in his father's
estate was, that, where there is an irreconcilable conflict, the later clause
will prevail as being the latest expression of the testator's intention. In
re Bates (1893) i59 Mass. (N. E.) 252; Foster v. Stevens (i9o6) 146
Mich. 131. This rule applies only where the later clause is as plain and
decisive as the first. Adams v. Massey (igo6) 184 N. Y. 62. The main
ground on which the court relied was, that only by allowing E. to take
a share, would the testator's intention of equality among his children
be carried out. On the other hand, as the minority pointed out, P., the
son of E., was provided for in place of E. by the testator in order to
bring about his scheme of equality. Furthermore, in view of the second
cause, if the testator intended E. to share in the event of the death of
a brother, it seems probable that he would have made a provision ex-
pressly mentioning E.
SJ. I. S.
WORKMEN'S CoirrExsATioN-H.nSAY EviDENCE-DEcLARATIONS OF
INJURED PERSON.-CARROLL v. KNICKERBOCKER ICE Co. (1916) 113 N. E.
(N. Y.) 5O.-The plaintiff, in seeking an award for injuries which
resulted in the death of her husband, offered as her sole evidence the
declarations made by the deceased to herself and the attending physician
shortly before his death. Held, that under the Workmen's Compensation
Law of 1914, such hearsay evidence was admissible, but insufficient to
raise an issue of fact, where opposed by direct testimony of eye-witnesses
to the event. Seabury, and Pound, JJ., dissenting.
The general rule excluding hearsay evidence has been followed in a
long line of cases in the above jurisdiction prior to the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1914. Waldele v. N. Y. C. &9 H. R. Ry. Co. (1884)
95 N. Y. 274; Greenfield v. People (1881) 85 N. Y. 88; People v. Davis
(1874) 56 N. Y. 95. Sec. 68, however, of that act provides that the
Workmens' Compensation Commission "shall not be bound by common
law, or statutory rules of evidence, or technical, or formal rules of
procedure . . . to ascertain the substantial rights of parties." As no
jury is employed in such cases it would seem proper that the technical
rules of hearsay evidence should be relaxed, even apart from statutory
regulation. Accordingly, it is not necessary, as indeed not possible, to
bring the declaration in the principal case within the exception admitted
on the score of res gestae. For the rule as to res gestae see State v.
Morrison (19o2) 64 Kan. 669; Commonwealth v. Werntz (1894) I6I Pa.
St. 591; Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. III, sec. 1749. But a distinct and
interesting limitation on the probative value to be accorded such evidence,
even though admissible, is found in the court's holding as a matter of
law that it cannot be considered sufficient to oppose any substantial
testimony offered by eye-witnesses to the event. The dissent with much
reason, in view of the nature of the tribunal, objects to this dogmatic
restriction.
L. W. B.
